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Abstract
Latin American economies are exposed to substantial external vulnerability. Domestic im-
balances and terms of trade shocks are often exacerbated by sudden ﬁnancial distress. In this
paper we explore ways of overcoming external vulnerability drawing lessons from a detailed com-
parison of the response of Chile and Australia to recent external shocks and from Australia’s
historical experience. We argue that in order to understand sudden stops and the mechanisms
to smooth them, it is useful to highlight and then draw a distinction between two dimensions of
investors conﬁdence: country-trust and currency-trust. While these two dimensions are interre-
lated, there are important distinctions. Lack of country-trust is a more fundamental and serious
problem behind sudden stops. But lack of currency-trust may both be a source of country-trust
problems as well as weaken a country’s ability to deal with sudden stops. We discuss steps to
improve along these two dimensions of investors’ conﬁdence in the medium run, and policies to
reduce the impact of country-trust and currency-trust weaknesses in the short run.
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Latin American economies are exposed to substantial external vulnerability. Domestic imbalances
and terms of trade shocks are often exacerbated by sudden ﬁnancial distress. In this paper we
explore ways of overcoming external vulnerability, drawing lessons from a detailed comparison
of the response of Chile and Australia to recent external shocks and from Australia’s historical
experience.
Why Australia? While it is much more developed than Latin America, it has several structural
features that make it similar to several countries in the region. In the ﬁrst place, through its
history it has been exposed to many external shocks due to large swings in its terms of trade
— commodities made up a large share of its exports (over 95% in 1900 and still around 60%).
Moreover, Australia has had long episodes of signiﬁcant external deﬁcits, which have often been at
the centre of the policy debate. For example, in May 1986 the then Treasurer (Finance Minister)
Paul Keating said that Australia risked becoming a ‘Banana Republic’ if it did not address it’s
declining international competitiveness which had led to substantial current account deﬁcits and
growing external indebtedness. Despite these similarities, Australia has been much less vulnerable
to external shocks.
Why Chile? Because on one hand Chile is arguably the most advanced economy in Latin
America in terms of institutional development and macroeconomic stability, and in this sense the
closest to Australia. On the other hand, Australia and Chile are a world apart in terms of their
response to similar real external shocks. While Australia can rely on access to international capital
markets to smooth these shocks, shifts in the supply of external funds often exacerbate the eﬀects
of real shocks in Chile. This proximity along one dimension and distance along the capital ﬂows
dimension, allows us to isolate those factors that make a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in terms of linkages
to international capital markets.
We start Section 2 with a comparison of the very diﬀerent responses of Australia and Chile to
the Asian/Russian crisis, and discuss the role played by capital ﬂows and exchange rate concerns.
We conclude that fear of a capital ﬂow reversal appears to be a more signiﬁcant ingredient in Chile’s
poor performance than fear of an exchange rate crisis. But we also point out that the absence of
a well developed currency-derivative market did exacerbate the capital outﬂows from the domestic
banking system in the face of increased exchange rate uncertainty.
Section 3 summarises our conclusions from this comparison. We highlight the importance of
drawing a distinction between two dimensions of investor conﬁdence: country-trust and currency-
trust, and proceed to sketch policy recommendations for a country with limited country-trust and
currency-trust. We discuss the importance of developing external insurance mechanisms that are
largely independent of local government actions and the idiosyncrasies of the local economy. In
doing so, we place the concerns of the “original sin” literature, which highlights the fact that some
countries are unable to insure externally by using their own currency, in a broader perspective. The
1way around “original sin” is to insure through a diﬀerent contingency, such as the ones we suggest.
It is also clear that the most fundamental problem for these economies is not “original sin” per
se, but insuﬃcient country-trust, which is the initial reason for demanding insurance. This section
then discusses how the development of a domestic currency-derivative market is key to reducing
the role played by domestic banks in exacerbating capital outﬂows during external shocks. It closes
by advocating a rules-based macroeconomic policy, which is also indexed to the contingency used
in the external insurance arrangement.
In Section 4 we outline the economic history of Australia over the past century in order to
extract lessons on how to build country-trust and currency-trust. For currency-trust we highlight
t h er o l eo fas o l i di n ﬂation record and clear policy rules, as well as the development of deep domestic
bond market with currency as its main risk, followed by the fostering of a local currency derivatives
market. For country-trust we stress the importance of a a clean sovereign default history, and the
development of a healthy domestic banking sector. Section 5 concludes by extracting lessons for
Latin America more broadly, including highly dollarised economies.
2 Similar shocks, diﬀerent responses: Australia versus Chile 1997-
1999
In this section we characterise the diﬀerent performance of Australia and Chile during the Asian-
Russian crisis. While these economies faced similar external real shocks, in the end Australia
sailed through these shocks while Chile suﬀered a severe slowdown. The main factor behind this
diﬀerential response is the behaviour of capital ﬂows. We characterise the nature of these ﬂows,
the key role played by the respective banking systems and derivatives markets, and dismiss a few
traditional fear-of-ﬂoating explanations. We conclude the section by highlighting the key diﬀerences
between these two economies in terms of country-trust and currency-trust.
2 . 1 T h eA s i a n / R u s s i a nC r i s i si nC h i l ea n dA u s t r a l i a
Chile experienced a substantial slowdown following the deterioration in its terms of trade and
external demand (as measured by trading partner GDP growth) that took place in 1998, as shown
in Figure 1. Annual growth fell to 3.2% in 1998 and then to -1% in 1999, a full 8% below the average
growth rate of the previous 10 years. At the same time, the current account deﬁcit narrowed to
0.5% in 1999, down from an average of 3% over the period 1986-97 and a peak above 5% before
the slowdown (Figure 2). Faced with similar external shocks the outcome for Australia was very
diﬀerent. In Australia, higher foreign borrowing ﬁnanced the temporary drop in income, so that
the current account deﬁcit doubled from around 3% of GDP at the beginning of 1997, and growth
was actually higher than average in both 1998 and 1999.
Following the negative external shock, the Central Bank of Chile (CBCh) set out to minimise
the nominal devaluation and rein in the current account deﬁcit, by implementing a contractionary
2monetary policy. As a result, interest rates on loans rose substantially in 1998 — the top panel in
Figure 3 shows the jump from pre-shock levels of 8% to above 18% for a period of time and an
average of 11% in 1998. At the same time, the CBCh intervened in the foreign exchange market
selling international reserves — which fell from US$18 billion in 1997 to close to US$15 billion in
1999. This behaviour is somewhat typical of economies that exhibit “fear-of-ﬂo a t i n g ”—ar e l u c t a n c e
to let the exchange rate play the stabilising role suggested by traditional open-economy models (see
Haussman, Panizza and Stein (2001), and Calvo and Reinhart (2002)).
The reaction of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) was essentially the opposite of that of the
CBCh. Interest rates were cut twice in 1997 and once in 1998, bringing rates down by 1.25% (the
target cash rate — the RBA’s policy instrument — averaged 5.4% in 1997, 5.0% in 1998 and 4.8%
in 1999). In addition, the RBA did not attempt to counteract the substantial depreciation of the
Australian dollar.1 By mid 1998 the eﬀective exchange rate had depreciated by 15% from its level
at the beginning of 1997. In contrast, by mid 1998 the nominal eﬀective Chilean peso exchange
rate was back at the early 1997 level, having appreciated slightly through 1997.2 In real terms the
depreciation (and the contrast) is even more extreme — 15% for the Australian dollar versus a 5%
appreciation of the peso over the same period as seen in the bottom panel of Figure 3.
There is no question that the stark diﬀerence in the reactions of the respective monetary au-
thorities played a role in the diﬀerences in performance of these two economies. But stopping there
is shallow analysis. These two authorities were subject to very diﬀerent pressures. While Australia
had only limited concern for a sudden stop, Chile was extremely worried by that possibility. In fact,
the sudden stop had already started in Chile at the time of the monetary contraction, and fears
for a catastrophe anywhere in emerging markets could be felt from Washington to Santiago.3 The
change in external ﬁnancing conditions faced by Chile in late 1997 and 1998 is evident in Figure
4, which shows the spread between the returns on Chilean corporate bonds and the rates on US
treasury bills. The spread on Chilean bonds rose by more than 50% in 1997 and then by more than
100% in 1998. Moreover, the price of Chilean debt in secondary markets is likely to understate
the constraints faced by Chile following the Asian and Russian crisis, as primary markets where
essentially closed during this period.
1The RBA did intervene on a few occasions, notably mid 1998 when there was seemingly large amounts of
speculative activity, but was certainly willing to allow the currency to depreciate.
2This uses the IMF eﬀective exchange rates for comparability. The depreciation of the Australian dollar based on
the RBA’s Trade Weighted Index, which uses diﬀerent weights, over this period was less than 5%.
3Of course, with the beneﬁt of hindsight, it is likely that the response of the Chilean monetary authority was
excessive. Moreover, see Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003) for an argument for why optimal monetary policy is
countercyclical even if that does little to reduce the real impact of the sudden stop once this takes place. But the
point of this paragraph and section is that the conditions faced by the two central banks were very diﬀerent, and
that the main reason behind this diﬀerence is in the actual and expected behaviour of capital ﬂows.
32.2 The Role of Capital Flows
Net capital ﬂows over the period 1998-99 behaved very diﬀerently in these two countries. For
Australia, net inﬂows in dollar terms were higher than the average net inﬂows for the period 1990-
96 as seen in Figure 5.4 For Chile, net inﬂows dropped by around 5% of GDP in 1998, and remained
below average for the rest of our sample.
Although it is the behaviour of net-capital ﬂows that is ultimately important from a macroe-
conomic perspective, it is useful to analyse gross inﬂows and outﬂows to shed light on the factors
behind the Chilean net capital ﬂow reversal. Following the Asian-Russian crisis, gross capital in-
ﬂows into both Chile and Australia increased. As seen in Table 7, in Chile most of the rise in
inﬂows in 1998-99 relative to the previous three years came in the form of FDI. In Australia, on the
other hand, there was a large rise in the other investment category of the capital account, which
is mostly made up of foreign loans. An important part of this is rising bank debt, although the
non-ﬁnancial sector also borrowed directly from abroad. This highlights that the similarity in the
behaviour of gross capital inﬂows to Australia and Chile is misleading: it is likely that Chile had
to sell heavily discounted assets to obtain funding, while Australia could borrow at non-ﬁre-sale
international rates.
The second and more signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two economies is the behaviour of gross
outﬂows. While outﬂows from Australia shrank in 1998-99, in Chile there was a rise in outﬂows in
both of these years. Following the terms of trade shock, Chilean residents shifted their portfolios
towards foreign assets. The outﬂows were particularly large in 1999, amounting for over 15% of
GDP.
A substantial part of the net capital outﬂow from Chile in this period can be explained by the
behaviour of two groups of institutional investors: pension fund management companies and banks
(especially foreign resident banks). This can be seen in Figure 6, which plots the net international
investment position of the Chilean private sector. Pension fund management companies (AFPs)
are major players in the Chilean capital market. In 1999, for example, the value of assets in private
pension funds was close to 50% of GDP. To put this number in perspective, consider that in the
same year equity market capitalisation was 100% of GDP and private bank credit close to 60% of
GDP. Pension funds increased the share of foreign assets in their portfolio substantially over the
period 1998-99. Starting from levels close to 1% in 1997, Figure 7 shows the share of foreign assets
in AFP portfolios rose to above 10% in 1999 — an increase equivalent to 5% of GDP.5 The rising
share of foreign assets coincides with widening legal limits on foreign asset holdings. Because of
this, it is hard to determine whether the higher share of foreign assets is the result of lifting binding
constraints or the result of changes in the optimum portfolio. If, however, the ﬁrst explanation
4Unlike output and terms of trade we look at deviations from the period 1990-97 because 1990 marks the return
of capital inﬂo w st oe m e r g i n gm a r k e t s .
5The rising share of foreign assets is not a result of the depreciation of the peso. This is evident from ﬁgure 7,
which also plots the share of foreign assets adjusting for changes in the dollar/peso exchange rate.
4were to be true then a substantial part of Chilean capital outﬂows would have be the result of
unfortunate timing on behalf of the pension regulators.
Where no such regulatory issues are at play is in the behaviour of Chilean banks — the other
main group of institutional investors behind the capital outﬂow. Rather than smoothing the loss
of international liquidity brought about by the terms of trade shocks, Chilean banks exacerbated it
by joining in the capital ﬂow reversal. Figure 8 plots the evolution of gross foreign assets as a share
of total assets for domestic and foreign owned banks. While all banks increased their positions
in foreign assets, the shift in foreign banks’ portfolio was more pronounced, rising to over 6% in
1999.6 Note, however, that this was not a permanent shift. By the end of 2002 the share of gross
foreign assets in banks’ portfolios was close to its initial levels. In contrast, in Australia over the
same period there was no jump in the share of foreign assets in banks’ total assets. During the late
90s, the share of foreign assets followed the same upward trend that had begun in the early 1990s.
2 . 3 E x c h a n g er a t ed e f e n s e ?
Some observers have focused on the exchange rate defense aspect of the contractionary monetary
policy followed by the CBCh, noting that it was not until September 1999 that Chile abandoned
its exchange rate band (which had been narrowed since the early phases of the external shock) and
allowed the peso to ﬂoat freely against the dollar. As we discussed above, this was not the case for
Australia, which did not base its policy response on a defense of the Australian dollar. Why would
policy makers in Chile be more concerned than Australia about a depreciation?
2.3.1 Unlikely (conventional) explanations
The ﬁrst conventional explanation was that the fear that high exchange rate pass-through to prices
would render the nominal devaluation ineﬀective in the medium run, leading only to high (and per-
sistent) inﬂation. The perceived inﬂationary risk was aggravated by prevalent indexation practices
inherited from previous inﬂationary episodes. The second concern, was that a devaluation could
actually have a negative impact on output because of balance sheet eﬀects arising from un-hedged
dollar-liabilities in the private sector. The perception was that inﬂated liabilities would activate
collateral constraints leading to reductions in output and investment.
Let us start with the fear of high inﬂation pass-through. There were concerns that a nominal
devaluation would lead to a jump in prices, so at best a brief real depreciation, and in the case
of a highly indexed economy like Chile to a period of prolonged inﬂation. Figure 3 suggests that,
ex-post, this was not the case, as the real exchange rate did depreciate substantially and inﬂation
did not pick up. In fact, inﬂation in 1997 was above 6% while average inﬂation during the period
1998-02 was only 3.7%. In addition, empirical estimates for Chile and Australia suggest similar
6See Caballero (2002) for a more extensive discussion of this point.
5degrees of pass-through in both economies. For Chile, Garcia and Restrepo (2001) ﬁnd that pass-
through is approximately 0.3 after 8 quarters, and even lower if there is a positive output gap (as
happens with a negative terms of trade shock).7 Long-run pass-through in Australia is estimated
to be around 0.3, and close to 0.2 after 8 quarters (Dwyer and Leong, 2001), not substantially lower
than in Chile.
What about dollarisation of liabilities? This is often cited as a justiﬁcation for fear of ﬂoating
in emerging markets. If ﬁrms or the government are exposed to signiﬁcant currency mismatches,
then the expansionary Mundell-Flemming eﬀects of a real devaluation will be oﬀset by the negative
balance sheet eﬀects of dollar debt.8 In addition, if foreign debt is denominated in a foreign
currency, then a real devaluation will increase the local currency value of required factor payments,
aggravating any existing liquidity shocks. On the whole, however, existing data suggest that unlike
some neighbouring Latin American economies, currency mismatches (at least in the conventional
sense) were not a severe problem in Chile. This does not mean that Chile would not beneﬁtf r o m
further reducing its level of “original sin”. As we discuss in detail below, foreign peso debt would
provide Chile with additional insurance in times of liquidity shocks — by transferring resources from
foreigners whenever the currency depreciates to accommodate these shocks.
We start by looking at currency mismatches at the aggregate level. Table 1 shows the net
international investment position for Chile and Australia at the end of 1997. Total net and gross
liabilities are larger relative to GDP in Australia than in Chile. The structure of these liabilities
also diﬀers. The stock of FDI is considerably high e ri nC h i l e ,b o t ha sas h a r eo fG D Pa n da sa
share of total liabilities. Outstanding debt, on the other hand, makes up a smaller share of Chilean
net and gross foreign liabilities. In 1997, private gross debt liabilities were 25% of GDP in Chile
and 42% in Australia while total gross debt liabilities, were 31% and 51% of GDP respectively.
Table 1 also shows that Banks play a larger role in intermediating capital in-ﬂows in Australia than
they do in Chile. In Australia, gross foreign liabilities in the banking sector are over 24% of GDP,
while in Chile banks foreign liabilities are less than 4% of GDP. Firms in Chile wishing to access
international capital must do so directly — either by issuing debt, issuing shares or via FDI — not
through the banking sector. More generally, BIS data suggest that in all of Latin America direct
borrowing by non-bank sectors from foreign banks is a larger source of ﬁnancing than bank to bank
lending. We return to this issue latter, and explore possible explanations and implications. The
main point we want to make at this time, is that Chile’s gross external debt was signiﬁcantly lower
than Australia’s in 1997.
Statistics on total foreign debt only provide a partial picture of currency mismatch, however,
as they ignore both the currency composition of debt and the response of income to exchange rate
ﬂuctuations. With this in mind, in Table 2 we build an aggregate measure of currency mismatch for
7For example, when there is an exogenous output gap of 2%, pass-through is below 0.115
8There is extensive theoretical literature on this issue. See for example Krugman (1999a, 1999b), Aghion, Bachetta
and Banerjee (2001) and Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2001). Empirical results are less abundant and categorical;
see Bleakley and Cowan (2003).
6Chile, Australia, and for a sample of other Latin American and small open developed economies.
Cross country data on the currency composition of total external debt are not available, so it
is not possible to construct exact measures of total foreign currency external debt. Instead, we
use Eichengreen et al’s (2003) measure of “original-sin” as a proxy for the share of foreign debt
denominated in foreign currency. To take into consideration diﬀerences across countries in openness
and the size of the tradable sector — and hence the eﬀect of real exchange rate on income — our
measure of mismatch is the ratio between our estimates of foreign currency external debt and total
exports. The ratio of foreign currency debt over exports is lower in Chile than in any other country
in our sample, and less than half the average of other Latin American economies. Other measures
of mismatch reported in Table 2 — such as net debt liabilities and net debt liabilities including
international reserves as a fraction of exports and of GDP — all suggest that Chile’s aggregate
exposure to exchange rate ﬂuctuations — its aggregate currency mismatch — was relatively low on
the eve of the Asian-Russian crisis.9
However, the degree of aggregate currency exposure is not the full story. The level and distri-
bution of dollar-denominated contracts within the economy is also likely to determine the eﬀects of
a devaluation on output, and therefore the optimal monetary policy response to a terms of trade
shock. As was the case for the aggregate, however, existing evidence suggests that currency mis-
matches where not a severe problem within the Chilean economy either. For a start, exposure of
the government balance sheets to exchange rate ﬂuctuations was relatively small on the eve of the
Asian crisis. According to a recent report by the Chilean Finance Ministry, gross central govern-
ment debt denominated in dollars, was 13.5% of GDP in 1996.10 The net exposure of the central
government balance sheets to a devaluation was even lower than this, considering that the Chilean
government held foreign currency denominated assets worth 5.5% of GDP.
Data from publicly listed ﬁrms suggest that private liability dollarisation within the Chilean pri-
vate sector was not a severe problem either. Figure 9 reports average levels of liability-dollarisation
for a sample of ﬁrms from eight Latin American economies. As can be seen, both the average and
median shares of dollar debt in total debt for Chilean ﬁrms were amongst the lowest in the region.
Whereas the median share of foreign currency debt in total debt of a publicly listed ﬁrm in Chile
was less that 5%, the median shares in Argentina, Peru and Uruguay were all above 60%. Figure 9
also suggests, that in addition to being relatively low (compared to neighbouring economies), dollar
denominated liabilities in Chile where concentrated amongst ﬁrms in the tradable sector. This was
not the case in Argentina, for example.
To look in more detail at the extent to which ﬁrms where “matching” the currency composition
of their debt with that of their income, we use ﬁrm level data to estimate the determinants of
liability dollarisation in Chile. Table 4 reports the results of estimating Equation (1) on a sample
9Note, that these measures of mismatch overstate the sensitivity of Australia’s indebtedness to currency movements
as Australia has a large foreign currency asset position on derivative contracts, as detailed in Section 2.3.2.
10Source: “Informe Estadisticas de la Deuda Publlica”, Ministerio de Hacienda Chile.
7of accounting data from 270 publicly listed ﬁrms for December 1997.
d∗
i = αo + α1tradablei + α2 (x/s)i + α3sizei + zib + εi (1)
where for ﬁrm i, d∗
i is the ratio of dollar denominated debt to total liabilities, tradable is a dummy
for ﬁrms operating in the agricultural, mining or manufacturing sectors, x/s is the ratio of exports
to total sales, ﬁrm size is measured as ln(total assets) and z is a matrix of additional ﬁrm controls
detailed in the table. The estimated coeﬃcients from this regression conﬁrm that dollar-debt is
higher — 7% higher in fact — in the tradable sector, and 13% higher in exporting ﬁrms. In addition,
the share of dollar debt is higher for larger ﬁrms, which are also those less likely to be subject
to credit constraints.11 Given the “matching” that takes place between the currency composition
of ﬁrm income and the composition of their liabilities, the negative balance sheet eﬀects of a
devaluation will be partly oﬀset by rising peso income.12 Indeed, a recent study by Benavente
et al (2003) for Chilean ﬁrms over the period 1990-2000 ﬁnds that amongst publicly listed ﬁrms,
those holding dollar debt do not invest signiﬁcantly less than their “peso-indebted” counterparts
in periods following a devaluation.
Firm level data collected from Bloomberg also allow us to carry out some comparisons of liability
dollarisation in Chile and Australia. Direct data on liability dollarisation are not available for both
economies, so instead we derive a measure of currency mismatch from the exchange rate losses











it is dollar debt in local currency, a∗
it are dollar denominated assets, ait are total assets and
∆et is the nominal depreciation. This allows us to construct mit, a measure of currency mismatch,
using ﬁrm level data on
fx lossit
ait and aggregate data on depreciations. As seen in Table 4 we ﬁnd
similar average values of mit for listed ﬁrms in Australia and Chile. Note, however, that this measure
does not take account of oﬀ-balance sheet hedging of foreign currency liabilities. We would expect
such hedging to be of greater signiﬁcance for Australia because of the larger currency derivative
markets and the substantial asset position in foreign-currency denominated derivative contracts
outlined in Section 2.3.2. What is evident in the raw data, however, is that in both countries
currency mismatch (as measured by mit)i sh i g h e rf o rﬁrms in the tradable sector — suggesting that
ﬁrms in Australia also match the currency income of their net foreign liabilities to that of their
income stream.
In conclusion, neither pass-through nor dollarisation of liabilities are strong reasons to support
11Similar results are found by Bleakley and Cowan (2003), and Cowan (2002).
12For comparison purposes we carry out a similar set of regressions for Argentina. We ﬁnd that the currency
“matching” that we see in Chile does not take place in Argentina. Not only is average dollar-debt considerably higher
in Argentinean ﬁrms, but it is distributed equally between tradable and non-tradable sectors.
8the view that the main concern of the CBCh was or should have been the stabilisation of the
exchange rate per-se.
2.3.2 A role for the exchange rate: banks and derivatives
There was, however, one clear reason to defend the exchange rate in Chile and not in Australia:
the protection of banks against a depreciation in an environment with limited currency-hedging
options.
As we discussed in the preceding section, Austr a l i a nb a n k sh a v ep l a y e da ni m p o r t a n tr o l e
in intermediating capital inﬂows. However, exchange rate risk is not passed on to the domestic
borrowers — as has often been the case in emerging markets — nor it is taken on by banks themselves.
Instead, banks hedge their net foreign currency liabilities using foreign currency derivatives. This
is an important point: in Australia, a developed derivatives market allows exchange rate risk to be
separated from loan decisions (credit risk). Small ﬁrms, likely to be more dependent on bank credit
and more vulnerable to currency mismatches, can therefore access international capital markets
through loans in Australian dollars from the banking sector.
What about Chilean banks? We showed above that on the eve of the Asian crisis banks in Chile
were not intermediating foreign capital, and that they did not start doing so during the crisis. We
also showed that following the external shocks in 1997, banks contributed to capital outﬂows by
increasing their holdings of foreign assets. Importantly, Chilean banks did not have the means to
eﬀectively unload the (explicit or implicit) exchange rate risk. Thus, it is conceivable that exchange
rate uncertainty was partly responsible for their role in capital outﬂows. The previous situation
was exacerbated for foreign resident banks whose measures of performance may be more directly
linked to foreign currency. It is also conceivable that the CBCh was concerned with this potential
link.
T h i st a k e su st ot h ed i ﬀerences in the development of derivatives markets in the two countries.
Australia has a highly developed currency derivative market, which is discussed in Section 4.2.4. A
recent survey conducted by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS, 2002), sumarised in Table
5, shows that total derivative turnover — a measure of derivative market coverage and liquidity —
is substantially larger in Australia than Chile. Indeed, turnover in market and over-the-counter
currency derivatives as a per cent of GDP is more that one order of magnitude larger in Australia
than it is in Chile. Derivative turnover with non ﬁnancial agents is also substantially higher in
Australia. This measure of turnover, nets out intra-dealer turnover and therefore provides a better
measure of actual transactions carried out by ﬁrms wishing to cover exchange rate positions. The
s a m eB I Ss u r v e ya l s os h o w st h a tm o r eA u stralian dollar trading takes place oﬀ-shore, which is
suggestive of larger net holdings by foreigners.13
To see how currency derivatives markets in Australia and Chile compare to a broader sample of
13Close to 2/3 of turnover in Australian is cross-border. None of Chile’s turnover is cross-border (BIS, 2002).
9countries Table 5 summarises turnover data from all countries reported in the BIS survey in 2001.
These data suggest that the derivatives market in Australia is large even by developed economy
standards. What about Chile? Relative to GDP, trade and capital ﬂows, total turnover in Chile
is higher than in the other Latin American economies included in the survey, but lower than other
emerging markets. This is true using Chilean data for 2001, or using derivatives data for Chile from
1998 (the survey year closest to the Asian/Russian crisis). Where Chile fares relatively “better” is
in terms of derivative turnover with non-ﬁnancial agents.
Do these numbers imply that Chile has an underdeveloped derivatives markets? To answer this
question we run a very simple cross country regression in which we relate the data from the BIS
survey to cross country variables that capture the degree of ﬁnancial development, openness and
overall level of development. Speciﬁcally we estimate
Fx= α0 + α1y + α2trade + α3fdev+ α4emu + µ, (2)
on the sample of countries included in the 2001 BIS survey. In this speciﬁcation Fxis currency
derivative turnover in 2001 scaled by nominal GDP, y is per capita income on a PPP basis for the
period 1996-00 (World Bank), trade is the ratio of exports + imports over GDP and fdevis the ratio
of private bank lending to nominal GDP (a measure of ﬁnancial development). Figure 10 plots the
ﬁtted values of turnover from this regression against observed turnover, and reports the estimated
coeﬃcients. As expected, turnover is positively correlated with openness, income per capita and
ﬁnancial development. The estimated coeﬃcient on the emu dummy, which indicates countries
that have adopted the Euro, is negative as expected, although not signiﬁcant at conventional
conﬁdence intervals. More interestingly, turnover in Chile is not signiﬁcantly below the predicted
value. Australia, on the other hand, has a larger derivative turnover than predicted. It is interesting
that South Africa and Poland, outliers in this regression, are also outliers in the Eichengreen et al
(2003) measure of original sin.14
These results — while tentative in that they do not account for endogeneity of the right hand
side variables — suggest that the level of development of the Chilean derivative markets is broadly
consistent with its overall level of development, openness and ﬁnancial development. One should
not expect, therefore, that a very rapid growth of Chile’s currency derivatives market will take
place, absent a deliberate set of policies aimed at boosting these markets.
We turn now to understanding how the Australian private sector uses the derivatives market
to hedge currency risk. First of all, according to a recent Australian Bureau of Statistics/RBA
survey (ABS, 2001 and RBA, 2002), derivatives have a large impact on the overall foreign currency
14In addition to the variables reported here we also estimated Equation (2) using a series of additional measures
of exchange rate volatility. We failed to ﬁnd any signiﬁcant correlation, beyond that reported for the emu dummy,
even using very “generous” conﬁdence intervals. The measures we used where: dummy variables for de-jure ﬁxed
exchange regimes in 2001 or median regimes over the last 5 or 10 years;a dummy variable for de-facto ﬁxed regimes
(from Levy-Yeyati 2003), dummy variable for commodity currencies (from Cashin et al 2002); share of commodities
in exports; and observed exchange rate variance over diﬀerent periods.
10exposure of Australia. While Australian resident enterprises had a net liability position in foreign
currency debt of A$164 billion they also had a net A$85 billion asset position in foreign-currency
denominated derivative contracts, implying that approximately half of the foreign currency debt
position is hedged.15 Unfortunately, it is not possible to trace who ultimately holds the other side
of the net hedging position of the Australian government and private sector (i.e. who has taken
on the Australian dollar currency risk through derivatives). What we can say is that since the
domestic ﬁnancial system in Australia is denominated solely in Australian dollars, it is not the case
that Australian households are eﬀectively holding the other side to these positions, leaving foreign
residents as the remaining candidates. The high share of oﬀ-shore turnover in total turnover, seen
in Table 6, also points in this direction.
Within broad sectors, the same study shows that foreign currency exposure was largest (relative
to total net foreign liabilities) in the non-ﬁnancial private sector and in the government. Banks
have a relatively small exposure considering the size of their foreign exchange liabilities. Note also
that banks are by far the largest holders of gross and net positions in foreign currency derivative
contracts in Australia.
Thus it would seem that the currency derivatives market in Australia plays two key roles. First,
it allows banks to decouple credit from exchange ra t er i s k .I nd o i n gs oi tp l a y sa ni m p o r t a n tp a r ti n
the intermediation of capital inﬂows by the banking sector, allowing a broader range of Australian
ﬁrms access to international capital markets. Second, it provides a mechanism for external insurance
against events that depreciate the Australian dollar by eﬀectively reducing total foreign borrowing
indexed to foreign currencies. We will return to these two aspects below.
3 Taking Stock and Short Run Recommendations
Why do countries like Australia and Chile respond so diﬀerently to similar shocks? And what
can the Chile’s of the world do to react more like Australia does? We split our answer to these
questions in two parts. In this section we explain the role of country-trust and currency-trust in
recent shocks and, taking these as given, discuss policy options open to countries like Chile. In
the following section we look more closely at the experience of Australia over the 20th century, to
extract lessons on how to build country-trust and currency-trust that may be relevant for emerging
market economies.
3.1 Why so diﬀerent?
There are at least three ingredients that helped Australia and not Chile during the recent episode:
(i) Australia had no concern (at least in relative terms) with capital ﬂow reversals; (ii) Australia
15Note that this measure of foreign currency “exposure” ignores the elasticity of export revenue to exchange rate
ﬂuctuations and substantial foreign equity asset holdings of A$228 billion. Indeed accounting for foreign equity assets,
in 2001 Australia has a net foreign currency asset position of A$149 billion
11could count on ex-ante external hedging indexed to exchange rate ﬂuctuations; and (iii) Australian
banks had access to a deep currency derivatives market to insulate themselves (and their borrowers)
from exchange rate ﬂuctuations. We discuss these in turn.
3.1.1 No fear of sudden stop
The ﬁrst ingredient is due to country-trust. In Chile there was widespread fear of a capital ﬂow
reversal. That is, it was feared that net capital outﬂows may lead to a balance of payments
crisis which would turn out to be much more costly in net present value terms than the contraction
brought about by high interest rates. Contractionary monetary policy was seen as a way of reducing
the need for external ﬁnancing (by reducing domestic absorption) and the extent of the capital ﬂow
reversal (by sending a pragmatic signal to investors). This mentality went beyond the actions of
the CBCh since resident banks and other private agents also were taking aggressive precautionary
measures. While the fear of a sudden stop may have been a consideration for Australia at the time,
the degree of concern was surely much lower.
Given Chile’s inﬂation target credibility, it could probably have let the exchange rate ﬂoat more
freely than it did during the Asian and Russian crises. It is also possible that a signiﬁcant part of
the adjustment of the AFPs was a once and for all portfolio adjustment to an unfortunately timed
relaxation of their constraint on external investment. But there is little hope that all sudden stops
and the fears associated to their anticipation will go away any time soon. Copper continues to be
Chile’s “bellwether” for foreign investors and also the latter are primarily specialists subject to a
variety of shocks. Recent research on “institutional” determinants of contagion conﬁr m st h i sv i e w ,
by linking ﬁnancial contagion to characteristics of developed economy markets and investors. A
country like Chile may be “contaminated” by a crisis event in another emerging market economy
if they both belong to a particular asset class (Rigobon 2001), borrow from the same banks (Van
Rijckeghmen and Weder 2000) or share a set of overexposed mutual funds (Broner and Gelos 2003).
While Chile may have come a long way in overcoming other aspects of its ﬁnancial fragility, it seems
u n l i k e l yt h a ti tw i l lb ea b l et oi n s u l a t ei t s e l fcompletely from shocks to its external supply of funds
in the near future simply because of “specialists” and “neighbourhood” eﬀects.
3.1.2 Exchange rate based insurance and “original sin”
The second ingredient is due to both country-trust and currency-trust. Foreigners are willing to
hold assets denominated in Australian currency. That is, they are willing to participate in an
implicit insurance arrangement with Australia, such that resources are automatically transferred
to Australia when a terms of trade shock is accommodated with a depreciation.
Note that this — and only this — is what is behind the “original sin” literature. While important,
it should be apparent that this is not the only ingredient behind external crises in emerging mar-
kets. In fact, it is not even likely to be the main ingredient in most cases. Australia did not develop
12currency-trust until the mid 80s, or at least did not use it before then as an insurance arrange-
m e n ts i n c ei td i dn o th a v eaﬂoating currency.16 The proportion of Australian-dollar denominated
government debt held by foreigners was less than 1% in 1980. Foreigners holding Australian local
currency debt is a phenomenon that starts in the 1980s.
Furthermore, Chile needs external insurance more than Australia does, precisely because shocks
to the supply of external funds are more powerful than the direct terms of trade shocks. That is,
“original sin” is a more serious problem for Chile than for Australia. But, importantly, “original
sin” is not the primitive problem (that is, the problem behind the need for substantial insurance);
the problem is a lack of country-trust.
3.1.3 Decoupling of risks
The third ingredient — currency hedging for banks — is based on currency-trust. Banks are highly
leveraged institutions that, at best, are well prepared to manage idiosyncratic credit risk but not
exchange-rate volatility risk (or other aggregate risks). Faced with a supply of funds in a foreign
currency, a bank has three options. The ﬁrst is to lend in the local currency, and take on exchange
rate risk directly. The second is to pass on the exchange rate risk to its borrowers, and by doing so
take on the credit risk of borrowers with a currency mismatch. The third is to oﬀ-load exchange
rate risk on other investors. Such investors could be domestic investors that are less-leveraged than
banks, or foreign investors willing to take on local currency risk. If the banking sector is unable
to oﬀ-load the exchange rate risk without taking on credit risk, then external shocks that raise the
volatility of the exchange rate lead either to a withdrawal of the banks from local lending or to an
increase in ﬁnancial fragility.
In the case of Australian banks, all of domestic savings are in Australian dollars, so that
banks only have to deal with currency mismatches when borrowing from abroad. In addition,
the deep Australian currency derivatives market allows banks to decouple their lending activity
from exchange rate risk. Australian banks borrow from abroad in foreign currency but lend in
Australian dollars to domestic ﬁrms. They then cover their net “dollar” liability position with
currency derivatives. In Australia, currency-trust is also combined with country-trust as foreigners
take some of this exchange rate risk.
Deposits in the Chilean banking system are also denominated in domestic currency, so that
as is the case of Australia, Chilean banks only have to deal with currency risk when borrowing
from abroad. Unlike their Australian counterparts, however, Chilean banks do not have a liquid
derivatives markets in which to buy exchange rate coverage. The result has been that Chilean
banks, unable to easily unload exchange rate risk, refrain from intermediating foreign funds. In
16Strictly, currency-trust could play an important insurance role even under a ﬁxed parity since it could allow
agents to modify out-of-equilibria scenarios and therefore prevent some perverse outcomes. However, this still would
require that there is extensive contracting with foreigners in local currency, which was not the case in Australia before
the 1980s (see Section 4.2.3).
13addition, external shocks that raise the volatility of the exchange rate lead to a natural withdrawal
of the banks from local lending.
The case of highly dollarised banking systems, such as Argentina or Peru, provides a more
dramatic example of the diﬃculties for banks of not being able to decouple exchange rate risk from
credit risk. Banks in these economies are hard pressed to ﬁnd even domestic agents willing to take on
currency risk. As a result of this (and prudential regulation limiting accounting mismatches) they
end up passing on the exchange rate risk to their lenders. Clearly the ﬁrst step for these economies
must be to understand and address the factors that drive the decision of domestic investors to save
almost exclusively in US dollars.
Note also that some countries may chose to ﬁx the exchange rate precisely to eliminate the
exchange rate risk for key investors, such as banks, when there is no other mechanism to remove this
risk. Argentina’s strategy during the 1990s could be thought of in these terms. Dollarised economies
eﬀectively operate in this fashion as well. Of course, this brings about other costs, including the
possibility that domestic positions become even more mismatched in the process, thereby increasing
the fragility of the economy. Except for extreme circumstances, ﬁxing the exchange rate is unlikely
to be the most eﬃcient mechanism to unbundle (micro) credit and aggregate shocks risks.
3.2 What can be done given weak country-trust and currency-trust?
Even in the best of circumstances, improvement in country-trust and currency-trust can only be
gradual. What is the best way to proceed in the meantime? In this section we discuss three
sets of policies aimed at ameliorating the eﬀects of low levels of country-trust and currency-trust.
The ﬁrst two of these seek to develop markets for contingent instruments that reduce the cost of
external and internal insurance. The third — contingent macroeconomic policy — seeks to improve
the private sector incentives to take adequate precautions against external crises, i.e. to purchase
this insurance.
3.2.1 External insurance
“Original sinners” have no currency-trust with foreigners, hence they cannot use exchange rate
ﬂuctuations as an insurance mechanism. Unfortunately, these countries need external insurance
even more than countries such as Australia since terms of trade shocks are leveraged many times
by the sudden stops associated with their weak country-trust.
This means that these economies should look for external contingent contracts that are not
dependent on domestic policy actions, or even on understanding the workings of the particular
country, but are highly correlated with sudden stops and external shocks. Good examples of these
variables are the price of copper for Chile, the price of oil and an index of US activity for Mexico,
the high-yield spread in the US for most emerging markets, and so on.17
17See Caballero (2003) and Caballero and Panageas (2003).
14Importantly, such instruments would provide the needed insurance regardless of the exchange
rate system and degree of fear of ﬂoating. External insurance is eﬀectively separated from the
exchange rate, thus breaking the connection between low currency-trust and limited external in-
surance.
3.2.2 Domestic Insurance
In order to prevent banks, especially foreign-owned (local) banks, from cutting back on their lending
in the face of exchange rate risk, they need a mechanism which will allow them to decouple their
lending activity from explicit or implicit exchange rate risk. Even if a country has limited external
currency-trust, it is often the case that there is an opportunity to eﬃciently redistribute currency
risk amongst domestic agents. For example, domestic households are willing to absorb some of
the exchange rate risk since much of their consumption and expenses are in nontradable goods.
Thus, it is important to develop the domestic currency derivatives markets to help domestic agents
oﬀset their opposing currency hedging needs and to enable banks to oﬄoad this risk onto willing
residents. In time, given the right conditions, foreigners will begin to participate in this market
and absorb more exchange rate risk. Interestingly, as we will describe in Section 4.2.4, a key ﬁrst
step for developing these markets seems to be to develop a domestic currency bond market. It also
appears that this can be done quicker with public bonds than with private bonds.
Of course, in economies where there is limited domestic currency-trust, such as in the heavily
dollarised economies, there is limited scope for such developments. In eﬀect, dollarisation of do-
mestic liabilities is an extreme form of the absence of a market to transfer the diﬀerential risks
associated to exchange rate ﬂuctuations.
3.2.3 Contingent Macroeconomic Policy
As we will discuss in the next section, clear and credible macroeconomic policies are key in the long
term process of building both country-trust and currency-trust. Having clear and realistic rules
and transparent policy making facilitates such a goal.
In addition to adopting standard good practices on inﬂation targeting and structural ﬁscal
mechanisms, authorities in emerging markets ought to analyse the interaction between these prac-
tices and the sudden stop mechanism. For example, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003, 2004)
show how indexing inﬂation targeting and foreign exchange interventions to the same contingencies
that are behind the external insurance discussed above, can be used to improve the private sector
incentives to take adequate precautions against external crises.
In a nutshell, the idea is to avoid providing — or generating the perception of — free exchange
rate insurance to the private sector. The free insurance may come directly from the government
or from potential lenders through low expected returns due to the illiquidity of domestic markets
during crises. A countercyclical monetary policy, while limited in terms of its aggregate demand
15impact, can help alleviate the incentive problems caused by free insurance and the optimal injection
of international reserves during external crises.
Of course, economies that lack domestic currency-trust cannot aﬀord to use monetary policy,
and its impact on exchange rates, as an incentive mechanism. Such countries may have to resort
to taxing short term capital inﬂows and impose tight liquidity ratios on foreign borrowing. These
are costly measures that ought to be imputed as yet another cost of lacking monetary credibility.
4 Building country-trust and currency-trust: Lessons from Aus-
tralia
4.1 Overview
This section describes how Australia has, in the period since its independence in 1901, gradually
developed currency-trust and country-trust. Section 4.2 outlines the development of currency-
trust through a clean inﬂation history, and the exchange rate not being unduly inﬂuenced by the
government. It also highlights the roles that the emergence of a government bond market and later
currency derivative market have played in transferring currency risk. Section 4.3 then considers
the development of Australia’s country-trust — the history of defaults and development of key
institutions.
When the six Australian colonies federated as the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901 perma-
nent European settlement had been established for only a fraction over 110 years and the total
population was just 3.8 million. The economy was heavily dependent on commodities, with the
main exports being wool (42%), minerals (26%), wheat (6%) and meat (7%). The economy was
relatively open, with exports accounting for around 20% of GDP, although over half of exports
were to the UK. With the strong growth of wool production from 1860-90 and the large discoveries
of gold in the 1850s Australia was already a relatively rich country.18 Governments had begun
to play a bigger role in the colonial economies following the gold rush with revenue raised from
land sales, tariﬀs and debt issued in London used to ﬁnance large public works programs, though
government expenditure was still just 10% of GDP. Federation gave the Commonwealth govern-
ment control of macroeconomic regulation and management and external issues while the states
remained responsible for the provision of services and a large part of social spending.
The dependence on commodity exports has meant that Australia has had many large swings
in the terms of trade over the century, as shown in Figure 11. On numerous occasions the terms
of trade has doubled or halved, transmitting large shocks to the real economy. Notable examples
include the 1920s and the Korean War boom. The terms of trade doubled in the early 1920s
leading to sustained high growth in the early part of the decade. But the subsequent reversal in
18At the turn of the century GDP per capita was around 90% of the levels in the US and the UK. Prior to the
severe 1890s recession in Australia GDP per capita was around 40% greater than the US (Maddison, 2003).
16commodity prices and the terms of trade over the latter part of the 1920s is credited with triggering
the Great Depression in Australia. A second example of the sensitivity of the economy to external
shocks comes shortly after World War II. Commodity export prices shot up with the outbreak of
the Korean war — notably wool (with a ﬁve fold price increase from May 1949 to March 1951)
and metals. The surge in demand precipitated a dramatic pick up in inﬂation with the resulting
restrictive policies combining with a sharp reversal in the terms of trade to precipitate a short-lived
recession.
Terms of trade shocks have been substantially smaller since the Korean War boom, though
mineral booms and busts in the early 1970s and 1980s have still been a large part of the cyclicality
of output growth. The decline in the volatility of the terms of trade is in part attributable to
growing diversity of exports, even within commodities.
The century since Federation have seen dramatic changes in the structure of the Australian
economy. Agriculture has declined from being one-quarter of total output to around 3% now.
Following the gold rushes, mining declined in importance over the ﬁrst half of the century, from
10% to 2% of GDP by 1950, but has since grown to be around 5% now. Despite these changes,
commodities still constitute approximately 60% of exports, though these are now quite highly
diversiﬁed, in contrast to the dominance of wool and gold in exports during the early part of the
century. Manufacturing grew strongly over the ﬁrst half of the century so that by around 1950 its
share in GDP was similar to other developed economies. Up to the 1970s and 1980s the Australian
manufacturing sector was probably more heavily protected than any rich country other than New
Zealand. However with few exceptions, trade reform has largely removed this protective barrier.
The other salient feature of the Australian economy has been the gradual shift in economic relations
away from Europe, and the UK in particular, toward the US and, more recently, Asia. At the time
of Federation 70% of Australia’s trade was with the UK, now it is around 5%. Meanwhile trade
with Asia has increased from around 10% of total just after WWII to over half now.
4.2 Development of currency-trust
4.2.1 Inﬂation Outcomes
Inﬂation performance clearly plays a large role in developing currency-trust. Controlling inﬂation
has generally been a fairly high priority of Australian government policy, with centralised wages,
a pegged exchange rate, restrictive ﬁscal and monetary policies, and even tariﬀ policy, all used at
various times. The result of this focus is that Australia has had moderate inﬂation for most of
its history with inﬂation over the century averaging 4%, and rarely greater than 10%, as seen in
Figure 12. Indeed in the 102 years since Federation Australian inﬂation has only exceeded 20%
in one year. In contrast inﬂation in Chile has been greater than 20% in approximately one-in-two
years over this period.
Australia’s inﬂation history in the ﬁrst half of the century was uneventful, with moderate,
17though relatively volatile, inﬂation. There were short bursts of sustained inﬂation following the
end of WWI and during WWII but neither episode lasted more than a few years. Likewise there
were sustained price falls for several years through the depression, but this too was soon reversed.
The ﬁrst episode of signiﬁcant inﬂationary pressure followed WWII. Signiﬁcant pent-up demand
for consumption goods following war-time rationing led to a rapid acceleration in inﬂation after the
war to be just under 10% by the end of the decade. The sharp pick-up in export earnings from the
Korean war boom precipitated a sharp spike in inﬂation in 1950-51, peaking at 25%. Other factors
were also at play in rising inﬂation, including an increase in the legislated minimum wage, the
relaxation of price controls, and the eﬀective depreciation resulting from the devaluation of sterling
in September 1949. However, the collapse in commodity prices was as rapid as the rise, resulting in
the terms of trade falling almost 40% the following year. The sharp reduction in export quantities,
a n de v e ng r e a t e ri nv a l u e s ,c o m b i n e dw i t ht i g h t e n e dﬁscal policy in late 1951 contributed to a short
recession in 1953 with inﬂation returning to single digit rates.
With unit labor costs rising, inﬂation was climbing before the ﬁrst OPEC oil shock. Inﬂation
increased further with the oil shocks, as in the rest of the OECD, to levels only seen in the Korean
War boom. Through much of the 1970s monetary and ﬁscal policies were contractionary in an
attempt to control inﬂation. Pagan (1987) describes policy as taking an “inﬂation ﬁrst” focus
based on the belief that growth could only resume once inﬂation was controlled. Policy was only
mildly successful in reducing inﬂation with it remaining stuck around the 8-10% rate. Through the
1980s the “Prices and Incomes Accord” (described in Section 4.2.2) became the key policy aimed
at reducing inﬂation. There was some decline in inﬂation, which Hughes (1997) attributes to the
Accord, though Carmichael (1990) suggests it was less successful in reducing inﬂa t i o nt h a nh o p e d .
In any case there wasn’t a large fall in headline inﬂation until the early 1990s recession. Since the
early 1990s the inﬂation rate has averaged around 21
2%, the middle of the inﬂation target adopted
by the RBA in 1993.
4.2.2 Inﬂation Policies
Next we consider the nature of the monetary framework over the century which delivered these
moderate inﬂation outcomes and enabled Australia to gradually develop currency-trust. The mon-
etary regime in Australia over its ﬁrst 100 years can be roughly divided into quarters. For the
ﬁrst three-quarters of the century Australia had a ﬁxed exchange rate, though for the ﬁrst quarter
this was a consequence of the banking system rather than oﬃcial policy. In the middle part of the
century, and particularly in the third quarter, while the exchange rate was ﬁxed, some indepen-
dence of monetary policy was possible due to the existence of capital controls. In the ﬁnal quarter
o ft h ec e n t u r yt h ee x c h a n g er a t eb e c a m em o r eﬂexible and consequently monetary policy more
independent.
Until 1910 Australian currency was issued by private trading banks and one state, though
sterling also circulated. The Treasury then took over the responsibility for the issuance of currency
18up until 1920 when it was transferred to the Note Board and then to the Commonwealth Bank, the
precursor to the Reserve Bank of Australia, in 1924. The government’s need for funds during WWI
led the Treasury to a quadrupling of the money supply over the course of the war. A consequence
of this short burst of rapid money growth was that the powerful and conservative banking sector
became vehemently opposed to the government having the ability to print money. Indeed it was
the private banks who eﬀectively determined Australia’s exchange rate policy up until 1931. The
banks strongly believed that parity of the Australian pound with sterling was a fundamental part
of a sound banking system. As a result their lending policies in Australia were dictated by the
balance of their funds in London and their ability to exchange funds at parity. While somewhat
clumsy, this system was eﬀective up until 1929 with the exchange rate never deviating more than
5% from parity (Schedvin, 1970).
With a balance of payments crisis building through 1929 and 1930 as Australia’s exports and
capital inﬂow slowed, but import demand did not, pressure began to mount on the unoﬃcial peg.
An outside exchange market developed and through 1930 the banks chased the outside exchange
rate with the Australian pound depreciating in small steps. In January 1931 the pretense of
maintaining parity ﬁnally broke with a new exchange rate set of A£1.3 per sterling. Later that
month the Commonwealth Bank, the government owned trading bank, took control of the exchange
rate and set the oﬃcial exchange rate at A£1.25. Over the next thirty years the Commonwealth
Bank progressively gained more central banking powers, while continuing to operate as a trading
bank, until a separate central bank, the Reserve Bank of Australia, was established in 1959.
The Australian currency was decimalised in 1966, with one Australian pound converting to two
Australian dollars. One year later the peg to the pound sterling was adjusted for the ﬁrst time
in 36 years. In December 1971 the peg was switched to the US dollar when the pound sterling
depreciated, recognising the diminished importance of the UK for Australia. In September 1974
the peg was switched to a trade weighted basket of currencies, while in November 1976 it became a
more ﬂexible crawling peg subject to daily adjustment. From 1976 monetary policy was directed by
the publication of projections for M3. This framework was replaced in 1985 by a ﬂexible ‘checklist
approach’ to the formulation of monetary policy.19
In 1983 sharp capital inﬂows precipitated the ﬂoat of the Australian dollar. Shortly afterward
in 1985 it depreciated sharply due to a steep fall in the terms of trade and declining ﬁnancial market
conﬁdence. While the RBA has intervened in the foreign exchange market at various times over the
period of the ﬂoating exchange rate this has been to smooth changes rather than target particular
values for the exchange rate. Indeed the Australian dollar is considered to be in the group of
cleanly ﬂoating currencies. An important implication of this clean ﬂo a ti st h a ti n v e s t o r sc a nb e
comfortable that the authorities will not deliberately pass currency risk onto foreign investors.
Indeed the exogeneity of currency risk is demonstrated by the close correlation the Australian
19The checklist consisted of inﬂation, the nominal exchange rate, interest rates, the balance of payments, monetary
aggregates and general state of the economy.
19dollar has had with commodity prices over the ﬂoating era (Chen and Rogoﬀ, 2003). The Reserve
Bank of Australia adopted inﬂation targeting in 1993 (2-3% on average over the course of the cycle)
and formalised this policy in an agreement with the government in 1996.
Australia had a centralised wages system for much of its century century of independence which
has frequently played a large role in controlling inﬂation and so the development of currency-
trust. While wage setting was done by an independent arbitration court, not directly by the
government, wages policy has nonetheless often been focused on controlling inﬂation outcomes and
boosting economic performance. Wages were indexed in several episodes, though indexation never
contributed to high inﬂation becoming entrenched as it has in some other countries. Indeed the
concern that indexation could lead to high inﬂation led to the modiﬁcation or abolition of indexation
on several occasions.
The centralised wage setting, based around a basic wage for unskilled labor, grew in prominence
after 1907 to become the dominant form of wage setting by 1930. The basic wage was notionally
indexed from 1922 (there had been some indexation from 1912) but at various times the basic wage
was adjusted to reﬂect economic conditions rather than the cost of living. Indexation was dropped
in 1953, immediately after the Korean war inﬂation spike. Indexation was reintroduced from 1975
to 1981 though it was neither full nor automatic, with partial and ‘plateau’ indexation often used
(so that higher paid workers received less than price increases). Again, in this high inﬂation period,
indexation was used to reduce real wages.
The election of the Labor Government in 1983 led to an “Prices and Incomes Accord” between
the government, unions and employers, bringing the concept of a basic wage back, and the use of
wages policy to control inﬂation, back to the fore. Full indexation to the CPI was used for two years,
from September 1983. However, following the depreciation in early 1985, from September 1985 to
March 1987, indexation was only partial, with inﬂation discounted by 2% so that the depreciation
wouldn’t lead to a price-wage spiral.
4.2.3 The Government Debt Market
Development of currency-trust also requires that foreign investors can take on local currency risk
on terms with which they are comfortable. Typically this will mean taking on the simplest form of
local-currency risk — that is absent of default risk and other forms of risk. In this section we discuss
the development of the Government bond market, which if it is free of default risk provides pure
currency risk and so seems to play a crucial role in getting foreigners to hold the local currency.
The issuance of government debt had began in earnest in the last quarter of the 19th century,
prior to Federation, as the colonial governments undertook greater spending on public infrastruc-
ture. Mauro, Sussman and Yafeh (2000) show that from 1875 to 1905 there was a greater than
ﬁve-fold increase in the value of Australian government bonds trading in London, with the share
of Australian bonds of total government bonds increasing from 1.4% to 5.6%. By Federation the
Australian states already had outstanding debt equal to their combined GDP. The Commonwealth
20government did not issue debt until 1911, and apart from substantial issuance in the two World
Wars, the Commonwealth did not have big increases in indebtedness. The states remained respon-
sible for the majority of Australian government debt, though their debt relative to GDP has tended
to decline since Federation.
At the turn of the century just 15% of the states’ outstanding debt had been issued into the
domestic market, with the other 85% issued in London (in sterling). (Figure 14 plots the size and
composition of state and Commonwealth debt.) The colonies had easy access to the London capital
markets and were able to borrow on favorable terms with low interest rates and long maturities.20
The favorable terms in the London market, and the small supply of domestic savings, led the
governments to favor issuing debt abroad. From early on the Australian governments were able to
issue long-dated debt. In 1913 their ﬁxed-maturity debt had an average maturity of just under 18
years, while 6% of debt had been issued as perpetuities.
Up until the mid 1920s all foreign government borrowing had been done in the London market.
After a small loan raised by Queensland, New South Wales and the Commonwealth made the ﬁrst
major forays into the New York market between 1925-28, when access to the London market was
restricted. Thereafter, abstracting from periods when one or the other market was closed, the
Commonwealth and states drew on both sources of international funds.
The ﬁrst sharp increase in Australian government indebtedness after Federation occurred in
WWI, as seen in Figure 14. The Commonwealth government, which is responsible for defense, ran
large ﬁscal deﬁcits to cover war costs (total government deﬁcits averaged 12% of GDP during WWI).
While the government increased tax and monetarised part of the deﬁcit, it also issued substantial
new debt. With the ability to raise the large funds required in the London market severely restricted
much of the new debt was issued in the domestic market (and so in domestic currency).21 By the
end of WWI almost half of the overseas debt represented credits advanced by the UK government
for military supplies bought in Europe. While public and private investment declined, presumably
due to reallocation of resources to the war eﬀort and uncertainty, the increase in domestic interest
rates on government debt suggests there was some crowding out by government borrowing.22 Total
government debt had increased to almost 125% of GDP by the end of the war. The Commonwealth
government also began to issue more debt abroad, taking advantage of the lower interest rates and
longer maturity available in London than in Australia, leading to an increase in the proportion of
Commonwealth debt domiciled abroad.
While the states did attempt to issue debt through the Depression, to pay for public works
20This was extended by the British Colonial Stock Act of 1900 which enabled many trust funds to purchase
Dominion bonds, giving the Dominions an advantage over many domestic borrowers.
21The Commonwealth government acted as broker for the states during the war to increase their chances of raising
loans in the London market.
22Separate domestic and foreign interest rates on government debt are not available for this period but the rise
in interest rates on Commonwealth debt relative to state debt, at the time the Commonwealth was issuing large
amounts of debt domestically suggests this is the case. Retail interest rates increase only slightly though these were
very sticky in the early banking system.
21and social expenditure, for much of this period the markets were closed so there was little increase
in nominal debt outstanding. Rather, most of the increase in the ratio of debt to GDP seen in
Figure 14 is the result of the 30% decline in nominal GDP.
Again in WWII the Commonwealth government issued large amounts of debt to pay for the
war. With international capital markets once again all but closed the government had to turn to the
domestic market. Unlike the experience of WWI, domestic private saving dramatically increased
to accommodate the increased borrowing. Indeed given uncertainty and the large scale redirection
of resources to the war it is not surprising to see that both public and private investment declined.
However, interest rates on domestic government debt declined over the course of the war suggesting
crowding out was not responsible for the decline in private investment.23 Once again, after the war
the Commonwealth government turned to the international market for its ﬁnancing, leading to a
decline in the proportion of Commonwealth debt issued domestically.
As seen in Figure 14, the state governments progressively issued more debt in the domestic
market over the course of the century so that by the late 1970s almost all of their debt was
issued domestically. This transition from debt issued abroad in foreign currencies to debt issued
domestically in the Australian currency was remarkably smooth with little disturbance from the
large ﬁscal shocks. This suggests a domestic bond market was progressively developing and the
states taking advantage of the cheaper domestic funding costs as the market grew in size.24 Indeed
the fact that interest rates on domestic government debt tended to be lower than those on foreign
debt suggests that, apart from the beneﬁts of longer maturity available abroad, governments tended
to borrow abroad because of the small size of the domestic market.
In the second half of the century the ratio of government debt to GDP declined fairly steadily
(Figure 14). Slightly smaller government deﬁcits contributed to the decline, but the strong economic
growth was by far the major factor. There was an increase in government foreign debt in the late
1970s and 1980s. It is apparently over the 1980s that foreigners ﬁrst begin to hold Australian dollar
denominated debt.25 Many commentators, including Stebbing (1994), have attributed this to the
ﬁnancial deregulation starting in the late 1970s which reduced the captive market for government
debt and made yields market determined, resulting in increases in Australian bond yields. While
Australia had been a heavy borrower from international capital markets throughout the century it
had done so in international currencies, mainly sterling and US dollars. Domestic-currency debt
(issued in the domestic market) had always been held by domestic residents. In 1980 less than
1% of domestic debt was held by foreign residents. However, over the late 80s and early 90s the
proportion of Commonwealth debt held by non-residents rose, even as the government rebalanced
23Interest rates on domestic government debt declined by almost a one percentage point over the war while the
rate of interest on foreign debt was relatively stable.
24An alternative interpretation is oﬀered by Bordo at al (2003). They argue that the development of the domestic
market for government bonds accelerated in those period in which international markets where closed.
25Through the second half of the 1980s there was some concern over Australia’s growing indebtedness, leading to
the downgrading of Australian government debt from AAA, though it never got below Aa2/AA.
22its issuance to Australian dollar denominated debt. Indeed since the mid 1990s around one-third of
Commonwealth debt has been held by foreigners, even though all outstanding debt is denominated
in Australian dollars. Toward the end of the 1990s Australian debt was upgraded and over the past
year has regained its AAA rating.
4.2.4 The development of currency derivative markets
Another key to establishing currency-trust is that domestic agents are able to spread foreign cur-
rency risk to those most able to bear it. The existence of a currency derivative market enables
this transfer of currency risk. It also provides an additional avenue for foreign investors to take
on pure local-currency risk. Indeed foreign investment in the bond market and foreign holdings of
derivative exposures require the same willingness of the foreign investors to hold domestic currency
risk. In this sense, the capability to develop credible money and bond markets would seem to be a
prerequisite for an active derivatives market
From 1939 the Commonwealth Bank, with the private banks acting as its agents, provided
forward cover to domestic residents engaging in international trade. This market remained small
until the breakdown of Bretton Woods in 1971. Over the course of the 1970s demand for currency
hedging in Australia grew with increased exchange rate volatility. But the oﬃcial market was
restrictive, it could only be used by domestic residents within 7 days of incurring a currency need
from international trade, and so there was residual demand for currency hedging markets from
capital ﬂows as well as for speculation and arbitrage.
In 1972 a proposal was put forward to trade foreign currency futures on the Sydney Futures
Exchange (SFE). It was argued that Australia already had the expertise and developed clearing
house facilities for currency futures as the precursor to the SFE, the Greasy Wool Futures Exchange,
had started in 1960. However, failure to gain government approval delayed the listing of currency
futures until 1980.26 The currency futures were cash-settled, the ﬁrst anywhere in the world, so as
to be compatible with foreign exchange controls. Not needing the same formal approval, a broker
based hedging market, which brought together two companies with opposite future currency needs,
started in the early 1970s but took oﬀ in 1975. Toward the end of the 1970s the banks became
more involved in this market.
With the ﬂoat of the Australian dollar in December 1983 the RBA stopped providing forward
cover facilities to the banks. Having developed experience through the 1970s, the domestic trading
banks began to provide a forward market in their own right. While most currency derivatives
are short-dated instruments, the existence of a well developed Australian dollar yield curve would
have facilitated the pricing of long-dated instruments. Banking deregulation in 1984 precipitated
the gradual amalgamation of the forward market and hedging market. With continuing ﬁnancial
deregulation and increased ﬁnancial sophistication the currency derivative markets grew steadily
26Only the US dollar contract lasted any length of time, before being delisted in the early 1990s.
23through the 1980s, and by 1991 the turnover in Australian dollar swaps exceeded that in the spot
market. Through the 1990s the currency derivative markets have continued to prosper, as seen
in Figure 15, though the pick-up in swaps toward the end of the 1990s is exaggerated somewhat
by the RBA’s use of swaps to conduct open market operations in the face of declining liquidity
in government securities markets. While there are no time series data on foreign participation
in Australian dollar currency derivative markets, anecdotal evidence suggests the participation of
foreigners in this market followed shortly after their participation in the government debt market.
As with other currencies, the OTC derivative market for the Australian dollar is several orders of
magnitude larger than the exchange traded futures market.27
4.3 Development of country-trust
4.3.1 Default History
A large part of developing country-trust is a history of demonstrating the commitment to repayment
of debt, especially foreign debt. In this regard Australia has a long history of developing this trust
with no experiences of default by the Federal or State governments. But this record was not achieved
easily. Notably in the Great Depression Australia was heavily indebted and was subject to large
shocks. Indeed, Australia was one of few countries heavily indebted at the outset of the Depression
that did not subsequently default. We outline this experience to demonstrate the commitment
required to develop country-trust.
Debt servicing costs began to rise in the late 1920s with the growing debt and slowing economy
and exports. In recognition that Australia’s ability to repay was declining, by 1929 New York was
no longer lending to Australia and loans from London had a substantially shorter maturity. The
Loan Council, which was formed in 1923 in order to oversee debt issuance to reduce competition
between the Commonwealth and states for domestic funds, had brought closer coordination of policy
and provided a forum for the collective acknowledgement of the governments’ dire situation.28 An
implication of the formalisation of the Loan Council later in the 1920s was that government debt
was amalgamated so that the states debt was explicitly guaranteed by the Commonwealth. Over
the course of late 1929 and 1930 the debate as to an appropriate course of action for policy grew.
Premier Lang of the state of New South Wales (NSW) proposed renegotiation of external debt,
notably that the interest on war debt be halved to the rate charged to Britain by the US, and the
abandonment of the gold standard. His plan was rejected by the state premiers, while the proposal
of Treasurer (Finance Minister) Theodore which eﬀectively called for an increase in the money
supply was vetoed by the government-owned but semi-independent Commonwealth Bank on the
grounds that it would be inﬂationary. After substantial deliberation, the “Premiers’ Plan” was
27In 1998 the turnover in forwards (swaps) was 3 (20) times larger than the turnover in Australian dollar futures
contract trading on the largest currency futures exchange, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.
28There was little competition between the governments in the London market as they all used the same under-
writing ﬁrm which ensured the timing of their issues was well spread.
24signed in 1931, partly on the advice of a Bank of England oﬃcial, cutting government expenditure
by 20%, increasing taxes and duties, cutting domestic bank interest rates and interest paid on
existing domestic, but crucially not foreign, debt. The conversion of domestic government debt to
lower interest rates was voluntary but hugely successful with a large propaganda campaign leading
to 97% of borrowers taking up the new loans with interest rates reduced by 221
2% and longer
maturities.29 The Premiers’ Plan was signiﬁcantly contractionary but as Schedvin (1970) notes
such drastic action was felt necessary to avoid default on government debt.
Default was seen to be a real possibility and the largest state, NSW, didn’t meet interest
payments on overseas debt from April to June 1931. However, the Commonwealth government and
Commonwealth Bank were keen to protect the rating of Australian governments as a borrower and
because of the centralised structure of the Loan Council made the interest payments on behalf of
NSW. Since the Australian government system involves greater revenue raising at the federal level,
and expenditure at the state level, the Commonwealth government was able to withhold revenue
from the state to compensate for the missed interest payments. Largely because of this episode,
Premier Lang was dismissed in 1932 by the state Governor.
4.3.2 Development of the Banking Sector
The stability of the ﬁnancial system plays a key role in country-trust and banks are at the centre
of this. Banks, modelled on English banks, were ﬁrst set up in the Australian colonies in the 1820s.
But it was not until the second half of the 1800s and the gold rush years that the banking system
became truly established. The end of a speculative boom in the early 1890s brought about the
collapse of 40 non-bank ﬁnancial institutions and caused 13 of the 22 banks to suspend payments.30
Schedvin (1970) argues that this experience shaped the banks’ conservatism thereafter. Despite
the banking crisis of the 1890s the ﬁnancial system was highly developed at Federation. The assets
of the banks were already 70% of GDP, while those of all ﬁnancial institutions were 107% of GDP.
On these measures Australia was not far behind the US and UK, and well ahead of Latin American
countries.31
The banking crisis also led to the dramatic growth of savings banks (from one-tenth of total
deposits in 1890 to almost half by 1945) to encourage saving. Many of these were founded by the
governments and so were perceived to be safer. The savings banks held the majority of their assets
as government securities (61% in 1914 up to 76% in 1945) and so provided a captive source of funds
for governments.
There was little regulation of the banking system prior to WWII when the central bank began
dictating overdraft rates, and later statutory reserve deposit ratios and liquid asset ratios. From
29There had been discussion of a 25% tax for loans that did not convert and there was an implicit threat to impose
such a tax if most debt did not convert. The 3% of “dissenters” ended up having their debt compulsorily converted.
30Only one did not reopen, though most had to restructure, often issuing shares in place of deposits.
31Another indicator of the development of the ﬁnancial sector is that M3 was around 60% of GDP.
25the end of the war up until ﬁnancial deregulation in the 1980s an increasing proportion of ﬁnancial
intermediation was conducted outside of the regulated banking sector. However the total size of
ﬁnancial sector was relatively stable over the 80 years after Federation.32 Banking deregulation
started in ernest in 1984 with the granting of licenses to 16 foreign banks. Since then ﬁnancial
deregulation led to the rapid expansion of the ﬁnancial sector with total assets to GDP more than
doubling over twenty years.
5 Concluding Remarks: Lessons for the Region at Large
In this paper we have compared the experiences of Australia and Chile during the Asian-Russian
crisis and described diﬀerent aspects of Australia’s economic history since its independence. We do
so in order to extract lessons on how to improve the resilience of Latin America to external shocks.
Chile is a good starting point because it has already resolved most other forms of instability, and
hence it allows us to isolate the external problem more cleanly. It is then possible to discuss how
additional constraints, such as extensive dollarisation or very weak monetary credibility modify or
limit the set of policies available.
Let us start by summarising the lessons for economies that do not have severe monetary credi-
bility problems with residents. In building country-trust, the experience of Australia reinforces the
obvious: a country will be trusted if it has a long history of sound institutions and non-opportunistic
behaviour. In the case of Australia, much of that trust was built from having experienced several
substantial external shocks without defaulting. It surely must have felt hard at the time, and
populist options — such as that of Premier Lang during the great depression — must have been
tempting. But Australia did not behave myopically, and the rewards could not be clearer today,
especially when compared with Argentina, a country with similar potential at the beginning of
the 20th century, but with much of it destroyed over time by its repeated lack of wisdom during
trying times. Another central pilar in Australia’s external trust appears to be a very solid and
conservative banking system, which learned the lessons of the banking crises at the end of the 19th
century. These banks play a key role today in intermediating external resources into Australia,
particularly when external conditions deteriorate.
Building currency-trust is also mostly a matter of common sense. It requires a good history
of inﬂation, and clear monetary and exchange rate rules. While inﬂation has been under control
for most of Australia’s history, recently the exchange rate policy has contributed signiﬁcantly
to the external holding of Australian dollar denominated instruments (a trend that contrary to
conventional wisdom, is only very recent as well). As discussed in Section 4.2.2, today currency
movements in Australia have a large exogenous component related to movements in commodity
prices and to the terms of trade. Therefore, not only is currency risk “exogenous” to Australian
policy makers, but it is also highly correlated with the price of commodities, which is a widely
32Over this period assets of ﬁnancial institutions ﬂuctuated between 80 and 100% of GDP.
26marketed risk. In contrast, Cashin, Cespedes and Sahay (2002) fail to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation
between a similar index of commodity prices and the real exchange rate in Chile (at least over the
1980-2001 period). This is surprising, given that if anything commodities make up an even larger
share of Chile’s exports.33 One explanation for the lack of correlation in Chile lies in domestic
policies. For a large part of the sample the exchange rate was not allowed to ﬂoat freely. In the
early 80s it was ﬁxed. Latter on, a system of exchange rate bands was put in place. The narrowing
and widening of exchange rate bands during the turmoils of the end of the 1990s is a ﬁnal example
of intervention. This implies that Chilean peso risk has a larger “endogenous” component than
Australian dollar risk — and as such is subject to the usual concerns about moral hazard, time
inconsistency, and so on. This makes it easier for Australians to ﬁnd willing external buyers of
Australian dollar risk. Not only is the risk “exogenous” to Australian policy makers, but it is also
highly correlated with the price of commodities, for which substantial futures markets exist. In a
sense, the problem, is not that the Chilean peso has been a commodity currency — but the opposite
— that commodities have played a relatively small part in peso-ﬂuctuations. Chile has began moving
in the Australian direction in recent years.
It also appears that in addition to sound and clear macroeconomic policies, foreign investors
need to be given a liquid market in which to take on currency risk with only limited exposure to
other risks, such as credit risk. Countries with sound public ﬁnances can do this by developing a
domestic public bond market in domestic currency (which could be indexed to the CPI, such as
with Chile’s Unidad de Fomento).34 Initially, these bonds will have high premia and the country
must be willing to pay that cost. It is also likely that initially most of the holding will be done
by domestic institutions which are less concerned with currency risk. Over time, and if everything
falls into place, the country will develop currency-trust, foreigners will hold a larger share of these
bonds, and the currency premia will fall to “reasonable” levels.
It is only a step from the adoption of sound monetary and exchange policies, and the devel-
opment of a good set of benchmark bonds, to the development of a currency-derivatives market.
Initially, such development may end up reducing foreign exposure to currency risk since foreigners
may chose to increase their participation in the local bond market but unload the currency risk.
This is only a transitory cost which is likely to be more than oﬀset by the increased participation
of foreigners in domestic ﬁnancial markets and, most importantly, by allowing domestic banks to
eliminate explicit or implicit currency-mismatch risk from their books. This should remove a key
factor behind the destabilising role played by banks during external shocks in Latin America.
In the meantime, while these institutions and markets are developed, there are several measures
that can be undertaken to reduce external vulnerability. In particular, external insurance can be
designed such that it is indexed to contingencies that, while highly correlated with external shocks,
33For the period 1990-99, for example the commodities included in the index amount to 58% of total exports in
Chile and 54% in Australia.
34Note that the external insurance required is against shocks that depreciate the real exchange rate, not inﬂationary
shocks per-se. This is the reason UF instruments would work as well.
27are not caused by the country directly. This form of insurance is certainly less complete than that
which is obtained from indexing it to domestic GDP or currency, but this is the cost of not having
suﬃcient currency-trust and country-trust, not a matter of capricious design. At early stages, the
choice is between signiﬁcant but incomplete insurance indexed to external contingencies, versus
minuscule complete insurance. Over time, as trust is built, the mix of external insurance can be
gradually shifted toward contingencies that include some endogenous factors, such as GDP and
local currency.
Similarly, macroeconomic policy should not only be made as predictable (in the sense of a
contingent rule or procedure) and transparent as possible, but also it should be used to align
private incentives with the aggregate risks that private decisions generate. Such objectives can be
achieved, for example, by indexing macroeconomic policies to the same contingencies used to build
external insurance. In particular, international reserves injections during external crises (perhaps
resulting from the central bank gains obtained from the external insurance) should be sterilised in
order to prevent the free insurance aspect of a strong exchange rate defense.
Most of these recipes also apply to dollarised economies, or economies where lack of monetary
credibility with residents is widespread. Although in such cases there is no hope of using mone-
tary policy to provide adequate private incentives, or develop extensive derivative markets. These
aspects of the plan need to be substituted in the transition by costlier measures such as taxes
on certain capital inﬂows and large international liquidity ratio requirements for domestic banks.
Similarly, the development of a domestic debt market in local currency is likely to be too expensive
to develop quickly, without being preceded by a clear eﬀort to develop institutions and implement a
sound and credible macroeconomic policy program. Once these are implemented, there is no ready
substitute for the passage of time. On the other hand, these economies have all the more reason to
accelerate the development of external insurance mechanisms as described above, which may even
be developed and fostered in domestic markets to improve the allocation of risks among residents.
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2Figure 3: Interest Rates and the Real Eﬀective Exchange Rate 1990-02
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3Figure 4: Chilean corporate risk premium
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7Figure 8: Banks: Foreign assets as a proportion of total assets
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11Figure 12: Australian current account
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14Table 1: International Investment Position 1997
per cent of nominal GDP
Chile Australia
Gross Gross Net Gross Gross Net
Assets Liabilities Liabilities Assets Liabilities Liabilities
Private sector:
Banks
Debt 1.4 3.0 1.6 4.8 22.3 17.6
Portfolio Equity 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.1 2.5 2.4
Non ﬁnancial private sector
Debt 11.6 21.6 10.0 4.6 18.9 14.3
Portfolio Equity 1.1 8.0 6.9 7.7 12.6 4.9
FDI 6.2 41.7 35.5 16.5 28.9 12.4
Private Sector
Debt 13.1 24.6 11.6 9.4 41.2 31.8
Portfolio Equity 1.1 8.6 7.5 7.8 15.1 7.3
FDI 6.2 41.7 35.5 16.5 28.9 12.4
Total 20.3 74.9 54.6 33.7 85.3 51.5
Government
General Government 0.6 5.8 5.2 0.3 8.8 8.5
Central Bank 22.1 0.2 ¡21.9 4.3 0.0 ¡4.3
Total 22.7 6.0 ¡16.7 4.6 8.8 4.2
Total 43.0 80.9 37.9 38.4 94.1 55.7
Memo items:
Chile Australia
Share of private sector oﬀshore bonds in local currency : 100 76
Share of public sector oﬀshore bonds in local currency : 100 63
Share of foreign currency deposits in total deposits : 3.5 -
Sources: Central Bank of Chile, IMF (2003) Balance of Payment Statistics and International Financial
Statistics. Bond currency composition data is from Eichengreen et al (2003), share of foreign deposits is
from De Nicolo et al (2003).
Notes: Debt = portfolio debt + loans + commercial loans + currency and deposits. General Government
corresponds to Central Government plus Other Public Sector.
15Table 2: External Debt 1997 (Selected Countries)
as a per cent of GDP
Total Total foreign Net foreign Net foreign debt
foreign debt in foreign debt in foreign in foreign currency
debt currency currency minus reserves
D* D*US$ D*US$ – A* D*US$ – A* – R*
Chile 27 27 13 ¡9
Australia 47 34 23 19
New Zealand 60 57 47 40
Canada 70 57 30 27
Israel 53 53 35 15
LAC 70 70 23 8
as a per cent of exports
Total Total foreign Net foreign Net foreign debt
foreign debt in foreign debt in foreign in foreign currency
debt currency currency minus reserves
D* D*US$ D*US$ – A* D*US$ – A* – R*
Chile 125 125 61 ¡41
Australia 291 209 142 116
New Zealand 280 266 218 187
Canada 206 168 87 79
Israel 238 238 157 68
LAC 299 295 140 57
Source: IMF (2003) International Financial Statistics, BIS, and World Bank (2002) World
Development Indicators.
Notes: D* (total foreign debt) = debt securities liabilities + other investment liabilities.
D*US$ (foreign debt in foreign currency) = D* adjusted by the share of external debt in
foreign currency from Eichengreen (2003). D*US$ - A* (net foreign debt in foreign currency)
= D*US$ minus foreign assets, where assets are deﬁned as the sum of debt securities assets
and other investment assets. D*US$ - A* - R* (net foreign debt in foreign currency minus
reserves) = D*US$ - A* minus reserves. The data of liabilities and assets were extracted
from IFS International Investment Position. LAC (Latin American countries) includes:
Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
16Table 3: Firm Level Determinants of Dollar Debt in Chile 1997
dependent variable:
dollar liabilities / total liabilities
(1) (2) (3)




exports / sales 0.290**
(0.120)
size (ln[assets]) 0.053*** 0.057*** 0.047***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.083)
Obs 232 232 232
R2 0.22 0.29 0.25
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Cowan and Kamil
(2004).
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. Sample includes
publicly listed ﬁrms only. ***, *** and * indicate signiﬁcance at 1, 5
and 10 per cent levels respectively.
Table 4: Firm Level Currency Mismatch Australia and Chile
Derived mismatch mit (per cent)
Australia Chile
Mean Median Mean Median
Non Tradeable ¡1.19 0.00 0.33 0.13
Tradeable 5.50 0.00 4.85 2.31
Total 2.38 0.00 3.00 1.13
Source: Authors’ calculations base on Bloomberg data.
Note: Derived mismatch is foreign currency liabilities net of for-
eign currency assets as a ration of total assets.
17Table 5: Turnover in derivative markets, 2001
Chile Australia Latin Emerging Developed Chile




as a per cent of:
spot currency turnover 0.4 3.1 0.5 1.2 2.5 0.6
trade ﬂows 4.4 78.1 2.1 6.7 32.3 3.2
trade + capital ﬂows 3.3 58.2 1.7 10.0 23.3 2.5
GDP 2.2 25.1 0.7 5.4 27.4 1.5
Derivative turnover with
non ﬁnancial agents
as a per cent of GDP 0.4 1.6 0.1 0.3 1.8 0.1
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey (BIS 2001); IFS (2003)
International Financial Statistics and World Bank (2002) World Development Indicators.
Notes: Trade ﬂows are the sum of exports and imports; capital ﬂows are the sum of gross capital inﬂows
and gross outﬂows. Total turnover corresponds to total transactions of currency derivatives contracts in
the foreign exchange and over-the-counter (OTC) markets with domestic and foreign agents, net of double
accounting. Derivative turnover with domestic non-ﬁnancial counterparts excludes turnover between report-
ing agents, between reporting agents and other ﬁnancial institutions and between agents and non-ﬁnancial
counterparts abroad. Emerging economies are those in the lower and middle income groups of the World
Development Indicators 2002.
18Table 6: Australian Foreign Currency Exposure by Sector
June 2001, A$ billion
Financial Sector
Instrument Banks RBA & Other General Other Total
CBAs(a) ﬁnancial govern- resident all
corps ment sectors sectors
FC denominated ﬁnancial debt
assets ¡69.8 ¡36.9 ¡33.6 ¡5.5 ¡10.6 ¡156.5
liabilities 186.5 8.8 61.4 4.1 60.1 321.0
Net position on debt 116.7 ¡28.1 27.8 ¡1.4 49.5 164.5
Principal of FC derivative contracts
in a bought position ¡435.3 ¡11.3 ¡69.8 ¡0.4 ¡31.7 ¡548.4
in a sold position 325.8 32.1 61.8 8.9 34.9 463.4
Net position on derivatives ¡109.5 20.8 ¡8.0 8.5 3.2 ¡85.0
Net position on debt
unhedged after derivatives 7.2 ¡7.4 19.8 7.2 52.6 79.5
Foreign equity assets ¡30.7 0.0 ¡84.0 0.0 ¡113.9 ¡228.5
Foreign Currency Exposure ¡23.4 ¡7.4 ¡64.1 7.2 ¡61.2 ¡149.0
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics.
Notes: (a) CBAs: State and Territory Central Borrowing Authorities
19Table 7: Composition of Gross Capital Inﬂows
US$ million
Chile Australia
1994¡97 1998¡99 2000¡01 1994¡97 1998¡99 2000¡01
By type of inﬂow:
FDI 3.9 6.9 4.1 7.7 5.9 8.3
Portfolio Equity 0.9 0.6 ¡0.3 5.4 8.4 4.6
Portfolio Debt 0.4 1.2 1.0 11.3 3.7 12.2
Other Investment 1.1 2.0 1.0 2.3 10.0 3.4
By type of agent:
Government Debt ¡0.8 0.0 0.2 3.2 ¡3.4 ¡2.2
Bank Equity 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4 1.4 1.3
Other Equity 0.5 0.5 ¡0.3 5.0 6.9 3.3
Bank Debt ¡0.4 ¡0.3 0.1 11.2 13.7 11.6
Other Debt 3.2 3.4 1.7 ¡0.8 3.4 6.2
FDI 3.5 6.4 4.1 7.7 5.9 8.3
Source: IMF (2003), Balance of Payment Statistics.
20Table 8: Currency Composition of Debt 1997
Sector (ISIC) Tradable, Dollar Debt / Total Debt
Non-tradable Chile Argentina
mean median mean median
Agriculture T 0.32 0.21 0.65 0.82
Mining T 0.34 0.09 0.73 0.85
Manufacturing T 0.37 0.31 0.53 0.62
Electricity, Gas and Water NT 0.21 0.00 0.63 0.74
Construction NT 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.55
Trade NT 0.22 0.17 0.49 0.61
Transport, storage and communications NT 0.32 0.13 0.54 0.62
Financing, Insurance, Real Estate
and Business Services NT 0.15 0.00 0.81 0.76
Community, Social and Personal Services NT 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.33
Tradable 0.40 0.38 0.56 0.63
Non-Tradable 0.15 0.00 0.58 0.63
Total 0.24 0.02 0.57 0.63
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Cowan and Kamil (2004).
Notes: For both Chile and Argentina tradable ﬁrms are those in Agricultural, Mining and Manufacturing
sectors. For Chile the sample is 237 publicly listed ﬁrms. For Argentina the data set includes 202 non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrms (publicly traded companies, publicly held but no publicly traded companies and privatized
companies).
21Table 9: Explanators of Derivative Turnover
Dependent variable ln(derivatives turnover / GDP)
Speciﬁcation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Income per capita 0.095*** 0.108*** 0.132*** 0.154*** 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.125***
(PPP) 1995-2000 (0.025) (0.028) (0.022) (0.026) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
(Exports + Imports) 0.713** 0.713** 0.844** 0.382 0.960*** 1.102*** 1.054***
/ GDP (0.349) (0.349) (0.355) (0.587) (0.344) (0.357) (0.354)
Private lending 1.015* 0.912
/ GDP (0.604) (0.614)
Dummy EMU ¡0.461
membership (0.501)






Years with ﬂoating 0.074
exchange rate (0.078)
(1995-2000)
Dummy for ﬂoating 0.212
exchange rate (0.385)
in 2000
R2 0.549 0.558 0.54 0.782 0.526 0.54 0.533
Observations: 46 46 46 15 47 46 46
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from BIS (2002), IMF (2003), International Financial Statistics,
World Bank (2002), World Development Indicators, Cashin et al (2001) and Levy-Yeyati et al (2003).
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